T-Bills and LIBOR

A rally in T-Bill yields, and/or a drop in the inter-bank lending (LIBOR) rate, then speculators and day-traders should buy the shares of the most solid banks.

But only in that case. If you happen to see both, then buy heavy (for a trade) because shorts will be covered.

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Financial Headlines: 1929 Vs. 2008

Bespoke Investment Group compiled a group of headlines for last week: “Someone once said that you can tell a story is really important when the Wall Street Journal runs the lead headline across the entire front page.

Well this week 26 September 2008, we didn’t get one day where the headline ran the entire front page, we got five! Whether or not you agree with the various actions taken this week, remember as much of it as you can, because whatever the outcome, good or bad, people will be talking about this forever."

There are other recent headlines, such as the one in the most recent The Economist issue:

This prompted us to find headlines that occurred in 1929-1932 and here’s what was found:

Stocks Soar As Bank Aid Ends Fear of Money Panic
– New York Herald Tribune, March 28, 1929

Banker Says Boom Will Run Into 1930
-- The World, March 30, 1929

September 1929
“There is no cause to worry. The high tide of prosperity will continue”- Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury

October 14, 1929

“Secretary Lamont and officials of the Commerce Department today denied rumors that a severe depression in business and industrial activity was impending, which had been based on a mistaken interpretation of a review of industrial and credit conditions issued earlier in the day by the Federal Reserve Board.”– New York Times

Brokers to Open Offices on Ships (ARE YOU SERIOUS?)
– The World, October 4, 1929

Public Liquidation Spurred by Bears, Hits Low Market
– The World, October 20, 1929

Brokerage Houses Are Optimistic on the Recovery of Stocks - Brokers in Meeting Predict Recovery
– The New York Times, October 25, 1929

Brokers Believe Worst Is Over and Recommend Buying of Real Bargains
– New York Herald Tribune, October 27, 1929

October 29, 1929 - Stock Market Crashes! Here’s a chart:

Gigantic Bank Pool Pledged To Avert Disaster as Second Big Crash Stuns Wall Street (sound familiar?)
– The World, October 29, 1929

Stocks Up in Strong Rally; Rockefellers Big Buyers; Exchanges Close 2-1/2 Days
– New York Herald Tribune, October 31, 1929

STILL OPTIMISTIC…
December 5, 1929

“The Government’s business is in sound condition.”– Andrew W. Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury

Very Prosperous Year Is Forecast– The World, December 15, 1929

June 29, 1930

“The worst is over without a doubt.”– James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor.

August 29, 1930

“American labor may now look to the future with confidence.”– James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor.

September 12, 1930

“We have hit bottom and are on the upswing.”– James J. Davis, Secretary of Labor.

October 16, 1930

“Looking to the future I see in the further acceleration of science continuous jobs for our workers. Science will cure unemployment.”– Charles M. Schwab.

November 1930

“I see no reason why 1931 should not be an extremely good year.”– Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., General Motors Co.

FINALLY SOMEONE SAYS IT:
January 20, 1931

“The country is not in good condition.”– Calvin Coolidge.

June 9, 1931

“The depression has ended.”– Dr. Julius Klein, Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

August 12, 1931

“Henry Ford has shut down his Detroit automobile factories almost completely.

At least 75,000 men have been thrown out of work.”– The Nation.

Rhea was RIGHT!:
July 21, 1932

“I believe July 8, 1932 was the end of the great bear market.”– Dow Theorist, Robert Rhea.

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How Complex Securities, Wall Street Protectionism And Myopic Regulation Caused A Near-Meltdown Of The U.S. Banking System Part 1

There’s no time to beat around the bush. Let’s flush out the three credit-crisis catalysts that have remained hidden for too long, thanks to Wall Street protectionism and myopic regulation. Those catalysts - which brought us to the brink of a financial meltdown - are structured collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and the horrific offspring of the two - credit default swaps on structured collateralized debt obligations.

An asset-backed security (ABS) is a type of tradable debt security that’s derived from a pool of underlying assets. We could be talking about a pool of mortgages, of automobile leases, or loans made to various borrowers. We’re using the example of residential mortgages, though the example is exactly the same for commercial mortgages, automobile leases or bank loans. Here’s how it works.

Anatomy of Mortgage Loan
A mortgage company makes home loans in your county, as does your local bank branch. Then an investment bank comes along and buys the mortgages from the mortgage company and from the bank. It only wants to buy the mortgages made to prime borrowers who are paying 6% interest on their mortgages. Once it acquires those loans, the investment bank securitizes the mortgages, meaning it pools them into a tradable package it can sell to investors.

This particular pool is known as a “closed pool,” meaning no more mortgages will be added, though some may leave the pool if the underlying borrowers pay back their mortgages early because they sold their homes, or refinanced them, or if underlying mortgages are in default and the “servicer” allows them to be removed from the pool. The only income coming into the closed pool results from the monthly interest and principal payments being made by the homeowners.

In our example - because all the mortgage loans were made to so-called “prime” borrowers with strong credit - you might have an investment grade (A+) security that pays 6%, because all the mortgage holders are paying 6% and the payments are being passed through to the investors. That’s it. There are very good, though not exact, methodologies to value this particular security, primarily because it is uniform in that all the mortgage payers are prime borrowers who all are paying 6%.

Asset-backed-securities become infinitely more complicated when they are sliced and diced into structured collateralized instruments. They generally fit into two main categories:

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which include all manner of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities.
And collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), which are pooled bank and investment-bank loan portfolios.

CDOs and CLOs are created from “closed-pool,” asset-backed securities. They are collateralized by the underlying assets - hence the prefix - but they are also “structured.”In our example above, our asset-backed mortgage security was rated A+ and pays the investor who buys it 6%. If I want to create higher-yielding securities that I think I will be able to sell a lot more of, I will pool mortgages from subprime borrowers.

Because subprime borrowers are, by definition, higher-risk borrowers, the mortgage companies and banks charge them higher rates of interest to offset the greater risk that they represent. If I pool these mortgages, their ratings would be “junk” - or close to it - which will be a problem as I try and sell these securities to investors all around the world.

That’s where the magic of financial engineering, better known as structuring, comes into play. I can divide up the closed pool of subprime mortgages and structure the pool into layers, or tranches. What I’ll do is divide up the pool into multiple tranches, or slices. I’ll structure the cash flow payments from all the mortgages so that if the 1st or 2nd tranches run into trouble, I’ll take cash flow payments from the lower tranches to keep up with all the payments to the holders of the 1st and 2nd tranches.

For someone trying to peddle these asset-backed securities, this is a stroke of genius. In our example, since I’m now pretty much guaranteeing that the 1st and 2nd tranche security holders are going to get paid, maybe I can get the Big Three debt-rating companies - Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service (MCO) and Fitch Ratings Inc. - to give my 1st and 2nd tranche CDOs’ investment grade ratings. Maybe I can even buy insurance from a monoline insurer like AMBAC Financial Group Inc. (ABK) or MBIA Inc. (MBIA), and get my top tranches a coveted “AAA” rating. Wow, I could sure sell a lot of this high-yielding stuff with an investment grade rating!
That’s just what happened. And they did sell a lot - a whole lot.

Those Troubling Tranches
As I said in Part II of this investigative series, CDOs - on an individual basis - are difficult to value. Indeed, “legend has it that constructing the cash flow payments on the first theoretical 3-tranche CDO (the simplest type of CDO) took a Cray Inc. (CRAY) supercomputer 48 hours to calculate.

The problem starts here. There are so many of these tranched securities out in the marketplace - and on the balance sheets of banks, investment banks, insurance companies, hedge funds and all manner of other unsuspecting investment entities worldwide - that when subprime borrowers began to default, it wasn’t long before the lower-tier tranches ran out of money to pay the so-called 1st- and 2nd-tier “AAA”-rated securities. The problem escalated quickly and almost all of these securities were downgraded. That’s not a surprise. Nor is it the whole story, for it leaves a key question unanswered.

What happened to the lowest-level tranches?
Those tranches were “ugly” to begin with because I started by pooling subprime mortgages (the high-risk borrowers). Then I made them “toxic” by “stripping out” their cash flow to support other tranches. This toxic waste was so bad, no one would ever rate it and only greedy hedge funds or crazy speculators would buy it for its high yield. Or, maybe, I think so much of my creation that I’ll keep this piece for myself, or maybe I’ll have to because no investor will ever buy it.

This kind of stuff is out there. There’s a lot of it. And only an act of God will bring these securities back from the depths where they now reside.

With their collateralized premise and structured nature, CDOs are very difficult to value - especially since no one trusts anyone else’s “internal valuation model.” Since everyone is afraid of these securities because no one really knows what they’re actually worth, no one wants to buy them.However, when an institution - such as a Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. (MER) - gets desperate enough to sell a portfolio of these securities at 22 cents on the dollar, then everyone else who has to “mark-to-market” their assets now has to value similar securities of their own at 22 cents on the dollar. That causes massive write-downs at banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. And these companies write down assets and watch their losses escalate, they are forced to raise additional capital to meet regulatory requirements.

CDS - Controlled Dangerous (Financial) Substances
It’s a vicious cycle - one that’s eroding our faith in our banks, and worse, banks’ faith in other banks. As a result, banks have ceased lending to each other out of the fear that the next round of write-downs and losses may imperil some of the trading partner banks that they used to lend billions of dollars to every night.

Not anymore.

It would be bad enough if that were the only problem facing the securities market. On top of these overly engineered structured securities I’ve just discussed, we also have credit default swaps with an estimated notional value of $62 trillion out in the marketplace. A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial derivative that’s akin to an insurance policy that a debt holder can use to hedge against the default by a debtor corporation, or a sovereign entity. But a CDS can also be used to speculate.

In Part II of our investigation, which ran Monday, I explained how problematic credit default swap pricing is and how the indexes against which the value of these swaps are determined are tradable themselves as speculative instruments and how the whole complex is driving the financial system into an abyss. That’s essentially what led to the collapse of the otherwise healthy insurance giant, American International Group Inc. (AIG).

Unfortunately, I don’t see the U.S. Treasury Department’s much-needed rescue plan being effective without actually addressing the problems facing both the CDO and the CDS markets. The Treasury Department’s initiative will create more problems than they attempt to solve and will eventually saddle taxpayers with so much debt that they risk sinking the dollar, and worse, the U.S. government’s investment grade rating. That would be calamitous.

Tomorrow (Thursday), in an addendum to this piece, I will outline a proposal that I’m calling the Money Morning Plan because it potentially heralds a new dawn in the credit crisis, addressing the problems from the bottom up, and not from the top down. Although this plan is straightforward and elegant in its simplicity, we still opted to present it as a separate story in order to provide you with the focus, the detail and the explanations we feel this strategy merits.
If the Treasury Department wants to immediately triage the gushing wounds that are bleeding our banks and financial system dry of readily available credit by purchasing and warehousing illiquid assets with taxpayer money, it won’t be long before the U.S. financial system begins to hemorrhage somewhere else.

The free market caused these problems under the noses of undistinguished regulators.
The free market - with the oversight of good governance practices mandated by effective regulators, who should not be empowered to kill entrepreneurial capitalism - will once again rise to the occasion and prove America’s robustness and indefatigable spirit.

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How credit default swap works Part 2

At this point, it makes sense to explain just what a credit default swap, or CDS, is. They were the key reason for the demise of AIG (AIG), and for the fear that if they were not bailed out that the whole ball of wax would come unglued. Essentially it is an insurance policy, but an unregulated one (the State of N.Y. just recently said that it would start to regulate part of the market — can you say closing the barn door?).

If you buy a bond from, say, General Motors (GM), you are lending them money for a set interest rate for a specified length of time. You face two sets of risks in doing so. The first is that they go bankrupt and don’t pay you back. The second is that interest rates rise and the bond falls in value (think of bond prices and interest rates as being on opposite sides of a see-saw).

With a CDS, you could go out and find someone who will insure against the default risk. For a given premium, the seller of the CDS will pay off on the GM bond if GM goes belly up. Now, if it was from a real insurance company, the insurance company would be regulated and would have to hold enough money in reserve to pay you off in case GM actually did go belly up. This is just like how a Life Insurance company has to have enough cash on had to pay off on your policy in case you die.

However, since this is an unregulated market, someone can sell you a CDS and blow the money in Las Vegas. In that case, if GM did go belly up, you would just plain be out of luck.

In the case of life insurance, there are strict limits on who can take out a policy on you. You can take out a policy on your own life, and on close family members. In some circumstances you can take out a policy on your business partner, but beyond that there are not many people you can take out a policy on. You have to have what is called an insurable interest; you can’t just wander the halls of the hospital looking for people who are unlikely to make it and take out life insurance policies on them.

This is not true for the CDS market. You are perfectly free to take out a “life insurance policy” on GM, GE (GE) or any other firm that issues a bond, and you do not have to be holding the bond. You can even take out a “life insurance policy” on the synthetic garbage the Wall Street has been pumping out.

This ability to buy insurance on things that you have no insurable interest in transformed this market into a huge casino. It is totally unregulated, and even the new steps by the New York State Insurance Commissioner, Eric Dinnallo, only covers the least egregious part of the market, where people actually have an insurable interest (i.e. hold the underlying bond). Regulation of this market was specifically prohibited under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2001. That provision was slipped into the bill in the dead of night by our old friend Senator Phil Gramm of Texas — now Vice Chairman of UBS (UBS).

People use this market to bet on the credit worthiness of companies, and often hedge funds will hold both long and short positions on the same underlying credit.

For example (NOTE: figures are made up here, not a reflection of the actual creditworthiness of GE), the hedge fund might make a bet that it is worthwhile to get $200,000 up front and be on the hook for $10 million if GE defaults sometime in the next five years. Then after a few months, GE raises a bunch of capital which significantly strengthens its balance sheet and lowers the risk of default, so it can make a bet with someone else who would now be willing to take just $100,000 to bet that GE will not go belly up within then next five years. The hedge fund could have a perfectly matched book, so in theory they were totally indifferent if GE survives or not.
However, suppose that the person who they made the bet with goes bankrupt themselves and can’t pay up. That hedge fund might then have a hard time paying its counter party. This is where the fear of “cascading cross defaults” comes in.

All this is to say that the CDS market has seen more growth than practically any market in the history of mankind. It is currently at over $62 TRILLION, up from under $1 Trillion a decade ago. It would not take a very big percentage of that market to fail to leave a very big mark on the world financial system. When the dust settles from all the current mess, bringing this market under control has to be high on the agenda.

I would suggest that the contracts be standardized and that they be traded on an exchange, where the exchange itself acts as the counter-party for each trade (this is how the commodity exchanges work). It might also make sense to require that any party buying a CDS have an insurable interest in the underlying bond (i.e. that they are using it to hedge, not speculate).

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